By Matthew Sussex
Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine is still in its early phases, but it has already delivered its main lessons. Vladimir Putin has made three critical misjudgements.
His first was that he miscalculated his ability to win quickly and cleanly.
His second was that Ukrainian opposition would swiftly crumble.
Third, he clearly reckoned the Western response would be fragmented and tokenistic.
In all of these, he has been proven wrong, which has significant implications for the future course of the war, for Russia’s international standing and for his own political fortunes.
Having embarked on a path that could only lead to regime change in Kyiv and the occupation of large chunks of Ukraine, Putin’s only option now to restart his army’s slow advance is to revert to the crudest tactic in the Russian military playbook: levelling cities with indiscriminate rocket strikes, bombing and artillery.
As millions shelter from Russian artillery and cruise missiles pounding Ukrainian cities, many are responding on social media with jokes and memes.
Putin was able to get away with that in Chechnya and even in Syria. But the grim destruction he will now need to wreak to get his way will make it clear to everyone — even Russians fed a steady diet of state propaganda — that his war is far from the limited and surgical campaign that he recorded days before February 25, when the announcement was actually aired.
Had Russian forces succeeded in taking over Hostomel airfield near Kyiv on the first day of the war, they would have been able to fly in large reinforcements, press quickly into the capital and likely either capture Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or force him to flee. The West would then have had little option but to shrug and implement some face-saving sanctions, while Putin spun his takeover domestically as further evidence of his strategic mastery.
That hasn’t happened.
Instead, Russian overconfidence and stout Ukrainian resistance has bolstered morale and turned Zelenskyy into a hero.
His response to an offer of evacuation from the US that “I need ammunition, not a ride” has fast become a symbol of his country’s spirit.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has demonstrated his country’s spirit and it has turned him into a hero.(U.S. Embassy Kyiv Ukraine/flickr.com/CC BY-ND 2.0)
So too has the bravery of the 13 Ukrainian defenders on Snake Island, a strategically unimportant rock near the Romanian coast. They were all reported killed after responding to the Russian navy’s insistence that they surrender with the words “Russian warship, go f*ck yourself”.
Even more poignant was the video of a Ukrainian woman insisting that invading Russian soldiers put sunflower seeds in their pockets so that they could grow from their corpses when they were killed.
Ukraine’s resistance has also finally stirred the previously complacent and supine EU into action.
Assisted by the efforts of “New Europe” – Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia – whose warnings about Russian aggression have been ignored for years, the larger powers in “Old Europe” have realised the need to take concrete action.
A concerted effort to block Russian banks, ban Russia from SWIFT, target the Kremlin’s inner circle (as well as Putin himself) and put export controls on a range of goods from aviation to energy extraction will have a deeper impact on the Russian economy than Putin would have anticipated.
It is true that Russia’s massive sovereign wealth fund of around $US630 billion ($871 billion) will cushion the blow, but the evolving sanctions package will nonetheless be felt by both Russia’s biggest companies, as well as its people – many of whom are at least ambivalent to the war in the first place.
Putin’s war in Ukraine also has lessons for the West. The EU has kicked the Russia can down the road for far too long and, in many cases, been complicit in funding Russia’s re-armament.
There is now a realisation in Europe and the US that for the foreseeable future, relations with Moscow will be competitive and conflictual in virtually every domain. This will be a shock to many European citizens, who will need to absorb hefty hikes in defence expenditure to finally provide Europe with the security capabilities it has relied on the US to provide.
Finally, there are the implications for the regime in the Kremlin and for Putin himself. Already there are signs that while attacking Ukraine had been planned for a long time — making the Kremlin’s pretence at diplomacy even more farcical — there had been very little consideration of how regime change would work.
Many of the key Russian agencies were left in the dark about the decision, which speaks volumes for how isolated and out of touch Putin has become.
Now that the idea that his invading forces would be welcomed by Ukrainians as heroes has been revealed as a propaganda fantasy, Putin faces real geopolitical, economic and domestic tests.
Externally, he has succeeded in turning Belarus into a proxy and will likely also succeed in installing a puppet in Kyiv.
But with Sweden and Finland now seriously mulling NATO membership, he faces a more united West — after having spent years patiently trying to divide it. Pressure will also grow on his advisers, especially Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu, as the search for scapegoats begins.
And a combination of disappointment by Russian oligarchs and business leaders, as well as public dissatisfaction with Russia’s economic fortunes, will begin to counteract Putin’s media firehose of nationalistic bombast.
Let’s not forget the tragedy unfolding
Fighting has been seen across major cities, including the capital Kyiv.
But although Putin’s war in Ukraine reveals his poor judgement, it is also a terrible tragedy.
It is a tragedy that Putin was allowed to obtain so much influence over a West that could have otherwise stymied him.
It is a tragedy for Russians who will continue to suffer for a long time under his kleptocratic rule.
And it is above all a tragedy for Ukrainians, who have ended up as sacrifices to Putin’s hubris and Western complacency.
Let it not be in vain.
Associate professor Michael Sussex is a specialist in Russian foreign and security policy and academic director at the ANU’s National Security College.